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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN GREENH~LGH, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
ELAINE G. GREEN, 
administratrix of the estate of 
GERALD F. GREEN, 
deceased, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10169 
BRIEF OF DEFEN'DANiT-RESPONDEN'T 
STATEMENT OF THE N~TURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries brought 
by an occupant of an automobile against the ad-
ministratrix of the estate of the deceased driver 
al'ising out of the roll-over of the vehicle. 
DISPOSITION IN DOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the administratrix of 
the estate of the deceased driver a summary judg-
ment of "No Cause df Action." 
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
Defendant wants the summary judgment af-
firmed. 
1 
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STATE'MEN'T OF FACTS 
The facts most favorable to the Plaintiff show 
that on or about October 18, 1963, the Plaintiff, 
Joseph 'Lockyer, a third person, and the deceased 
driver, Gerald F. Green were involved in an acci-. 
dent on U.S. Highway 91 approximately five miles 
south of Cove Fort, Utah whrle on a deer hunting 
trip. (Dep. 6-7). 
The deceased, Gerald F. ~Green was the sales-
manager for the Peerless Barber and Beauty 'Supply, 
and Joseph Lockyer and the plaintiff were salesme:q 
for the same Company. This was the last of a num-
ber of hunting and fishing trips that they had taken 
for mutual pleasure and enjoyment. (R. 21). 
At the time o'f the accident, they were riding 
in a Dodge Pickup ·Truck owned by the deceased, 
Gerald F. Green. Mr. Lockyer was sitting in the 
middle and Mr. Greenhalgh, the plaintiff, was sit-
ting on the right side and allegedly Mr. Green was. 
driving. (R. 21). 
In his deposition, Mr. Greenhalgh stated the 
expenses of the trip were to he sp'li t three ways, 
with each member sharing and paying an equal 
part of the expense. An occupants of the car at the 
time of the acci'dent were residents of Salt Lake 
City and on the night before the trip started they 
met at the home of Mr. Green and then left to make 
purchases for supplies for the trip. At the AG 
Market on east 33rd south near the Motor-Vu 
Theatre some food was purchased. The plaintiff 
2 
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~tated that Mr. Green purchased two- fifths of 
vodka, two - fifths of bourbon and they purchased 
four cases of beer at the AG store. Further, the 
plaintiff said Mr. Green filled the Dodge Pickup 
truck with gas in Salt Lake City, Utah and that no 
other gas was obtained until Holden, Utah where 
the plaintiff stated he paid for the purchase of some 
gas. (Dep. 16-17). 
No claim is made that Mr. Green was guilty 
of willful or wanton misconduct or that he was 
intoxicated, but it is interesting to note that a11 
bottles of bourbon and vodka were opened at the 
time of the accident, and that the occupants of the 
automobile were drinking beer or had just finished 
drinking beer at the time of the accident. (Dep. 
19-20). 
Two years before this acc:ldent occurred, the 
plaintiff and Mr. Green had gone on another hunt-
ing trip for deer and had shared expenses equally. 
(Dep. 21.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF 'LAW THE PLAINTJIFF WAS 
A GUEST IN THE DECEDENTS AUTOMOBILE AT 
THE TIME OF THE AOCIDEN'T. 
Section 41-9-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953, de-
fines a guest in an automobile as follows: 
"GUEST DEFINED - For the purpose of 
this section the term ''guest" is hereby de-
fined as being a person who accepts a ride 
in any vehicle without giving compensation 
therefor." 
3 
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Further, with respect to the duty owed to a 
guest, Section 41-9-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
provides: 
"Responsibility of owner or driver of a ve-
hicle to guest - Any person who as a guest 
accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon 
any of the public highways of the state of 
Utah, and while so riding as such guest re-
ceives or sustains an injury, shall have no 
right of recovery ,against the owner or driver 
such vehicle. In the event that such person 
whi'le so riding as such guest, is killed, or 
dies as a result of injury sustained while so 
riding as such guest, then neither the estate 
nor the legal representative or heirs of such 
guest shall have any right of recovery against 
the driver or owner of said vehicle by reason 
of the death of said guest. If such person 
so rides as a guest be a minor and sustain 
an injury or be killed or die as a result of 
injury sustained while so riding as such guest, 
then neither the parents nor guardians nor 
the estate nor legal representatives or heirs 
of such minor shall have any right of recovery 
against the driver or owner or person respon-
sible for the operation of said vehicle for in-
jury sustained or as a result of the death of 
such minor. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as relieving the owner or driver or 
person responsible for the operation of a ve-
hicle from liability for injury to or death of 
such guest proximately resulting from the in-
toxication or willful misconduct of such own-
er, or driver or person responsible for the 
operation of su~h vehicle; provided, that in 
any action for death or for injury or damage 
4 
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to person or properly by or on behalf of a 
guest or the estate, heirs or legal represent-
atives df such guest, the burden shall be upon 
plain tiff to establish that such intoxication 
or willful misconduct was the proximate cause 
of such dea:th or injury or damage". 
'The plaintiff contends because of the agree-
ment to share expenses of the trip that he was not 
a guest in the deceased's automobile at the time of 
the accident. If the plain ti'ff is a guest, he is barred 
from recovery, be'cause neither willful misconduct 
nor intoxication a:re alleged in the complaint. 
In Jensen vs. Mower (1915'6) 4 U. 2d 336,294, 
P.2d, 683, this court said that if a driver of an auto-
mobile extended the courtesy of the ri'de to a friend 
without more or takes on a hiker overtaken on a 
highway, the status of "guest" would within the 
n1eaning of the automobile guest statute, is not re-
placed by that of passenger merely because gasoline 
is purchased, meals are paid for, or cash is given 
by the rider to assist the driver in meeting the ex-
penses of the trip. In Jensen vs. Mower, supra, our 
court said our guest statute is substantially the same 
as the California statute which reads: 
"No person who as a guest accepts a ride in 
any vehicle upon a highway without giving 
compensation for such ride* * *has any right 
of action for the civil damages against the 
driver of such vehicle * * * unless the Plain-
tiff in any such action, establishes that such 
injury or death proximately resulte'd in in-
toxication or willful misconduct of said 
driver." (Emphasis added) 
5 
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In the leading case of Whitmore vs. French, 
('1951) 37 Cal. 2d 7 44, 235 P .'2d 3, the California 
Supreme Court used this 'language: 
"The designations 'passenger" and 'guest' 
have been adopted for the purpose of distin-
guishing a person who has given compensation 
within the meaning of section 403 of the Ve-
hicle Code from one carried gratuitously. 
Gruzie vs. Sanders, ·2'37, '2'41, 1413 Pacific 2nd 
704. A person who accepts a ride does not 
cause to be guest and become a passenger 
merely by extending ·customary courtesies of 
the road, such as paying bridge or ferry tolls 
(see Rest., Torts, Section 490, a), and it has 
been held that the sharing of expenses does 
not destroy the host and guest relationship if 
nothing more is involved than the exchange of 
social amenities and reciprocal hospitality. 
McCann vs. Hoffman, 9 Cal '2nd, 279, 70 Pa-
ci'fic '2nd 909. Where however, the driver re-
ceives a tangible benefit, monetary or other-
wise, which is a motivating influence for 
furnishing the transportaJtion, the rider is a 
passenger and the driver is liwb1e for ordinary 
negligence. (Citing cases.)" 
In Harper and James, Law of Torts, Volume 
II, Section 16.'15, Page 95'8, it is stated: 
"* * * All agree that the occupant is a guest 
where he obtains the benefits of the ride if 
his presence confers none upon the host except 
the satisfaction of hospitality and social re-
lationships. On the other side, the passenger 
who pays money as a fare, and not by way of 
reciprocating hospitality in clearly not a 
guest.'' 
6 
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In California in McCann vs. Hoffman (19'37) 
9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P. 2d 909, the California Supren1e 
court, sitting in bank, sustained a judgment of non-
suit, for two couples who went on a family auto-
mobile trip to an apparent tacit and natural under-
standing that such expenses would be equally shared 
and when an accident arose at an intersection on 
the trip. 
In McCann vs. Hoffman, supra, the California 
Court said: 
"The great weight df authority is to the effect 
that the sharing of the cost of gasoline and 
oil consumed on a trip when that trip is taken 
for pleasure or social purposes, it is nothing 
more than the exchange of social amenities 
and does not transform into a passenger one 
who without such exchange would be a guest, 
and consequently is not payment for the trans-
portation or compensation within the meaning 
of statute. It is obvious that if a different re-
sult obtained under any construction of sta-
tute, its purposes would be defeated and its 
effect annulled. 1The relationships which will 
give ride to the statute, of a passenger must 
confer a benefit of tangible nature and are 
limited''. 
In another California case, Kroiss vs. Butler, 
(1954) 129 C. A. 2d 550, 277 P. 2d 873, where 
the plaintiff tried to hag a golden goose subsequent 
to an accident which occurred on a quail hunting e~i­
pedition and where the plaintiff claimed he was a 
passenger for hire because he has superior knowl-
edge of terrain offering seclusion, cover and feed 
7 
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for quail, and superior ability to call quail and to 
recognize signs of quail, and where the driver and 
appellant were friendly and had hunted together 
previously, and where each party took his own gun 
and shells, where the driver selected the place to 
hunt and where there was no discussion regarding 
their relative abilities, the court held evidence not 
sufficient to support a verdict for the appellant. 
In Kansas, in Bedenbender vs. Watts, (1'955) 
177 Kan. 531, 280 P. 2d 630, where a lawsuit arose 
subsequent to a pheasant hunting trip, the court de-
clared where the parties of the pheasant hunt had 
agreed to share expenses and where the trip was for 
social and mutua'! pleasure and where there was an 
arrangement to share expenses for gasoline, oil and 
meals, that the payment for those did not constitute 
payment for transportation within the meaning of 
the guest statute and that the parties enjoyed the 
relationship of host and guest and the court affirmed 
a Judgment of Dismissal on demurrer to the com-
plaint. 
In South Dakota in Schlim vs. Gau ( 1963) 
____ S. D. ____ , 125 N.W. '2d 174 where four friends 
were on an antelope hunting trip under an arrange-
ment whereby they were to share the automobile 
expenses an'd where an accident occurred aft~r the 
automobile owner permitted another member of the 
hunting group to drive it, and where the trial judge 
directed a verdict for the defendant driver, the :ap-
pellant court held that the tria!l judge correctly di-
rected the verdict for the defendant driver as the 
8 
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arrangement to share expenses for gasoline did not 
change the plaintiffs' status from that of guest to 
passenger. 
In Nevada, in Kuser vs. Barengo (1953) 70 
Nev. 66, '254 P. 2d '245, where the p'laintiff asked 
for a ride to a convention in Las Vegas from Reno, 
where the parties lived, and where permission to 
take the trip was taken with the understanding that 
each party would pay ~a portion of the expense for 
the gasoline and auto, the court held as a matter of 
law, the plaintiff was a guest and coul'd not recover. 
In Ansback vs. Greenberg, (1953) 2'56 S.W. 
2d 1, the Kentucky 'Court, where the plaintiff and 
defendant went to Florida to visit the daughter of 
the plaintiff, and where the trip was made in the 
defendant's automobile, and driver fell as~eep, and 
where it was agreed the plain tiff would pay one-
half of the cost of the gas and oil, and court held 
the plaintifs were '·'guests" of the defendant and 
not "paying passengers," an'd that within the mean-
ing of the Georgia guest law, the plaintiff could not 
recover for accidental injuries unless such acts were 
caused hy gross negligence, which the facts did not 
show. 
In Idaho in Riggs vs. Rogers ( 1'95'3) Idaho 3'7 
743, 264 P. 2d 698, the Idaho court said mere 
paying for gas and oil or sharing payment therefore 
of itself is not sufficient to establish a passenger 
status where the occupant paid nominal cost to help 
defray the expenses of the transportation. 
9 
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In Colorado, in Mears vs. Kovacic ( 1963) ___ _ 
Colo. ____ , 38'1 P. '2d 991, the Colorado Supreme Court, 
sitting en bane, held where the automobile occupant 
had agreed to pay the driver, a close personal friend, 
for such incidental expenses as gasoline, oil, food 
and lodging, but did not contemplate paying driver 
for depreciation of automobile or otherwise compen-
sating the driver 1and the plaintiff occupant was a 
guest within the guest statute, and that as a matter 
of law sustained the trial court's Judgment of Dis-
missal. 
In argument it is submitted this trip was moti-
vated or induced by the members who wished to 
satisfy the social pieasure of a hunting and camp-
ing trip, and that the lower court, recognizing the 
ordinary facts of life, properly resolved the question 
in favor of the defendant administratrix. 
Manifestly, these men didn't drive to southern 
Utah merely to share in the expenses of the trip 
equally three ways. All substantial evidence clearly 
indicates the sharing of expenses was merely an act 
of social reciprocation and that it was not compen-
sation for the ride. 
In Utah in Smith vs. Franklin, (196'2) 14 U. 2d 
16,'376 P. '2d, 541, the question :arose as to what con-
stituted compensation sufficient to change what 
normally would be a "guest" to a "pass'enger" for 
hire. 'This quote said: 
"It must be conceded that where it is shown 
that the driver is basically a social guest, 
10 
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neither the giving of just any compensation, 
which might be some inconsequential amount 
of money or other consideration of value, or 
even the sharing of expenses, merely for so-
cial reciprocation for the ride, would change 
the relationship of that of "passenger" to 
that of "passenger for hire." The phrase com-
pensation therefore, as used in the statute 
mean compensation for the ride. Therefore, 
it would have to be sufficient money (or other 
thing of value) that it reasonably could be 
supposed that the party so regarded it. But 
whether there is profit in the tram.saction is 
obviously not the determining factor. Where 
payment for the ride is the main inducement 
for it, the fact that there may also exist some 
social incentive which makes giving the ride 
enjoyable or desirab'le for the driver could 
not change his character to that of host 1am.d 
guest.'' 
Further, in Smith vs. Franklin, supra, it is 
interesting to note that the rider paid $2.00 for gas, 
a sum which the driver deemed sufficient to pur-
chase the gas for the trip, and thereafter the ques-
tion was submitted to the jury ~as to whether or 
not plaintiff was a passenger for hire, and the jury 
found the plaintiff was not, and thereafter on ap-
peal, two dissenting, justices of this court indicated 
that as a matter of law the tri1al court should have 
held the giving of the $2.00 fare vvas not compen-
sation. 
In summary, it is submitted this trip was mo-
tivated by the mutual desire of the members to do 
some hunting and engage in a little social drinking. 
11 
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The $6.45 the plaintiff paid for a tank of gas at 
Holden, Utah was merely an act of social reciproca-
tion. Mr. Green furnished the car and purchased all 
gas ~rut the start of the tri!p. The plaintiff's purchase 
of the $6.45 of gas was an exchange of one social 
amenity for another. After all, he stated they were 
to share the expenses equally three ways from 
the supplies taken, it's clearly evident they took 
the trip to hunt deer and do a little drinking and 
not merely for the purpose of sharing expenses, or 
-compensating Mr. Green. 
POINT II. 
THERE rS NO COM1PETENT EVIDENCE THE 
RlDE WAS INDUGE!D BY OFFE'R OF COMPENSA-
TION. 
The respondent claims as a matter of l~a,w no 
compensation was given and that the plaintiff was 
a· guest in the decedent's automobile at the time of 
the ra;ccident. However, for the sake of argument this 
point is discussed as at the pre-trial hearing where 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, 
Mr. Dihb'lee said he could prove that the decedent 
was induced to take his car by an offer for compen-
sation. 
'The respondent contends proof of the rider 
being induced by an offer of compensation is barred. 
What induced Mr. Green to drive his car is par-
ticularly within his own knowledge. Section 78-11-12 
Utah Code Annotated provides: 
"Injury to person or death - No abatement 
12 
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of cause of action upon death of wrongdoer-
Action against personal representative of 
tvrongdoer- Evidence required- Causes of 
action arising out of physical injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or 
negligence of another, shall not abate upon the 
death of the wrongdoer, and the injured per-
son or the personal representatives or heirs of 
one meeting death, as above stated, shall have 
a cause of action against the personal repre-
sentatives of the wrongdoer; provided, how-
ever, that the injured person or the personal 
represenbatives or heirs of one meeting death 
shall not recover judgment except upon some 
campetent satisfactory evidence other than 
the testimony of said injured person." (EM-
PHASIS ADDED) 
Further, paragraph 3 of Section 78-24-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 19'53, provides that the following 
person cannot be witnesses : 
('3) "A party towny civil action, suit or pro-
ceeding, and any person ,directly interested in 
the event thereof, and any person from, 
through on under whom such party or inter-
ested person derived his interest or title or 
any part thereof, when the adverse party in 
such action, suit or proceeding cl·aims or op-
poses, sues or defends, as guardian of an in-
sane or incompetent person or as executor or 
administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any 
deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or 
grantee, directly or remotely or such heir, 
legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, or 
transaction with, such deceased, insane or in-
competent person, or matter of fact whateve1'·, 
which mttst have been equally within the 
13 
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knowledge of both the witness and such in-
sane, incompetent or deceased person, unless 
such witness is called to testify thereto by 
such adverse party so claiming or opposing 
suing or defending, in such action, suit or pro~ 
ceeding." (EMPHASIS ADDED) 
It is equally within the know ledge of the de-
cedent, Mr. Green, what was said at the time the 
share-expense arrangement was made. However, it 
would be peculiarly within the knowledge on1y of 
Mr. Green what induced him to taili:e the plaintiff 
along. Mr. Lockyer and the plainti'ff, the other par-
ties of the share-expense agreement were persons 
directly interested in the event and each are or 
were clients of Mr. Dibblee. Any opinion they had 
as to any matter of fact or a sta:tement by Mr. Green 
would be barred by Section 78-24-2 which is com-
monly spoken of as the "dead man's act." 
In Andreades vs. McMillan (19'53) C.T. of Civ. 
App. of 'Tex., 256 S.W. 2d 4'77, where a personal in-
jury action was brought 'against an administrator of 
a deceased motorist whose vehicle collided with the 
vehicle in which the p'laintiff was riding and where 
it was held the trial court properly refused to allow 
introduction of testimony of plaintiff as to the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the collision the 
court quoted from Holland vs. Nimitz 111 Tex, 
4'19, '2'3·2 8. W. 2d 298, '299, 2'3'9 S. W. 2d 185, in 
which the Supreme Court of Texas said. 
'''The object of the statute was to prohibit the 
interested heirs and legal representatives from 
14 
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testifying as to facts, or opinions based upon 
observations, arising out of any transaction 
with the decedent which the decedent could, 
if living, contradict or explain. Death having 
sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law 
for reason founded upon public policy seals 
the lips of the other." 
The purpose of the dead man's statute is to 
put the parties upon terms of equality in regard 
to giving evidence of the transaction. 
In Davis vs. Pearson (t941) 2'20 N.C. 163, 16 
SE 2d 655, where ian action was brought against the 
adn1inistrator of a deceased motorist :for injury sus-
tained in an automobile accident it was held plain-
tiff's testimony concerning the events preceding 
and subsequent to accident were inadmissable under 
statute as concerning a personal transaction between 
the plain tiff and the deceased. 
In Burke vs. Peter, ('1951) 11'5 U 58 202 P 2d 543, 
where an action was brought by an administratrix 
of an estate to recover a promissory note found in 
among the possessions o'f the deceased 1am.d signed 
by the defendant as payor, this court held the trial 
court did not err in refusing to allo\v the defendant 
to testify concerning alleged lack of consideration 
for execution of note, where such fact was equally 
within the knowledge of the defendant and the de-
ceased, and where administratrix did not testify 
concerning that transaction but only testified about 
a conversation purporting to referred to non-pay-
ment of the debt owed by defendant to the deceased. 
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As a result of the enactment of Section 78-11-12, 
Utah Code Annotated 19153, no longer does death 
of the wrongdoer aba;te an action against the 
estate or personal representative of the wrongdoer. 
However, the injured person may not recover judg-
ment against the administratrix of the estate except 
on competent satisfactory evidence other than the 
testimony of s1ruid injured person and it is submitted 
that the dead man's act bars the ·plaintiff and Mr. 
Lockyer from offering testimony as to what induced 
Mr. Green to take him on the trip. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits the plaintiff's deposition 
shows as a matter of law the pl'aintiff was a guest 
and he did not give compensation for the ride. The 
judgment of the lower court shou~d be affirmed. 
Futher, it is noted that in the ease of Smith vs. 
Franklin 14 U. 2d 6, 37!6 P 2d 5'41, the question of 
whether or not the plaintiff was a guest as ia matter 
of law was not before the court as it was not neces-
sary to consider the question in the Smith vs. Frank-
lin case inasmuch as the jury found the plaintiff 
was a guest. 
Respectfully submitted. 
RAYMOND M. BE'R'RY 
203 Executive Building 
45'5 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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I hereby certify that on this ------------------------ day 
of September, 19'64, I mailed two copies of the afore-
going Brief by United States mail, postage prepaid, 
to Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black, Attorneys 
at Law at the address shown on the cover of this 
brief. 
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